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BOOK REVIEWS
Honesty and Competition. GEORGE J. ALEXANDER. Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press. 1967. Pp. xv, 302. $10,00.
One of our more popular political games of the moment is certainly "consumerism," and, apparently, any number can play. Professor
Alexander's book is a compendium of the past, current, and possible
future rules of the game, and its subtitle--"False-Advertising Law and
Policy under FTC Administration"-marks the boundaries around a
fertile field of play.
The veteran professional team is, of course, the Federal Trade
Commission, coached since 1961 by one of the game's more spritely
innovators, Chairman Paul Rand Dixon, a playing manager who hits
for both average and distance. Recent Congressional entries (whose
several stadia have been the scene of some of the game's most colorful
contests) have a record of sustained victory, streaks only slightly tempered by the fact that committee chairmen often serve simultaneously
as team captain and referee.
Other federal agencies play an exhibition schedule of at least
Triple-A calibre.1 Sideline entertainment has been provided by Ralph
Nader, perhaps the first freelance cheerleader to gain national recognition, and, more lately, Betty Furness, current White House champion. Lively minor league action has been and will be seen in a score
or more of our state legislative arenas, 2 while Canadian and British
1 For instance, one recalls that, quite apart from its statutory responsibilities, (e.g.,
Spear & Staff, Inc., CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP.
77,216 (1965)), the Securities and Exchange
Commission has taken occasion to publicize its concern at the placement in particular
media of financial advertising opposite stock market reports. Along similar lines, recent
anti-tobacco edicts of the Federal Communications Commission look to a balancing of the
"editorial content" of broadcast advertising of cigarettes.
2 State enactments dealing generally with false or deceptive commercial practices have
been more or less incited by, or modelled in some degree upon, various proposals for such
legislation sponsored by the FTC, the Council of State Governments, and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, whetted perhaps by the Reports of
the House Committee on Government Operations. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 445, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963); H.R. Rp., No. 921, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). For representative acts, see
Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 to -1534 (1956); HAWAII REy. LAws §§ 205-1 to -13 (1955);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 261-72 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 2451-62 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010-.920 (Supp. 1967). For a current proposal discussing various relevant considerations, see NEw YORK STATE BAR AsS'N,
REPORT OF THE COUMITTEE ON NEW YORK STATE ANTITRUST LAv (1967). For a study of the
Uniform Act, see Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade
PracticesAct, 76 YALE L.J. 485 (1967). For common law developments, see Dole, Merchant
and Consumer Protection: The New York Approach to the Regulation of Deceptive Trade
Practices,53 CORNELL L. REv. 749 (1968).
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portents3 indicate that the game may soon become as international as
soccer.
With the sport booming so, Professor Alexander's rulebook arrives
none too soon for combatants planning the next game, spectators devoted to video replay, and old-fashioned Monday morning quarterbacks.
The book begins with a quick survey of the standards evolved by
the FTC to limit deception in the offering of goods and services, and
follows with a chronicling of virtually all the errors of omission and
commission of the hard-running, guileful ball handlers who have challenged consumer credulity in the past. According to Professor Alexander, the Commission's decisions reflect simply a determination to
identify and proscribe deception for deception's sake, without pinpointing the public interest being protected or revealing much Commission
awareness of its potential function in clearing the channels of communication for the transmission of meaningful product information.
Many would agree that this is valid criticism. It may well follow that
such forensic tools as "false and misleading" and "public health and
safety," invoked in the name and interest of the "credulous" and "trusting" consumer, of "wayfaring men, though fools," and even of "Mortimer Snerds," 4 have sped the demise of that old hero of the common
law, caveat emptor, without markedly realigning advertising objectives.
Pointing to the diverse views of the Commission's role, which some
years ago split the District of Columbia Circuit in Alberty v. FTC, 5 and

the countervailing, if sporadic, affinity of the Commission for requiring
affirmative disclosures-often of a quite particularized nature-in advertising, Professor Alexander comes down foursquare for a positive
FTC policy "to encourage the informative function of advertising."
The bulk of the text comprises an imaginative and thorough analysis of the particular sins of those who have sought unfair commercial
advantage in the trumpeting of their wares. Product names are often
misleading, suggesting nonexistent attributes and differences from
competitive offerings. Similar difficulties are encountered in promoting
3 The Canadian Parliament is currently considering a bill to make false advertising a
misdemeanor. C-195, Sec. 102 (1967). British champions of consumers have advocated overall
limitations on corporate advertising expenditures, seemingly more a noise abatement (and
antimonopoly) scheme than an effort to compel honest advertising.
4 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937); General Motors Corp.
v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941). Cf. Independent
Directory Corp., 47 F.T.C. 13, 31 (1950) (dissenting opinion), af'd, 188 F.2d 468 (2d Cir.
1951).
5 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
6 The words are from Judge Bazelon's dissent in Alberty. Id. at 45.
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product capabilities and functions and in accurately and fairly transmitting price information at both pre-trial ("list" pricing and preticketing) and retail (value and cost claims, "free" goods, and special
sales) levels. The pace picks up somewhat as we tour through the sections on false indicators (trademarks and other trade symbols), testimonial advertising, and some of the more hardcore promotional gimmicks, such as the essentially fraudulent and uniformly condemned
"bait-and-switch" lures and unsolicited deliveries.
The catalog finally pays considerable attention to gambling promotions and lotteries, areas to which practitioners have long been alert,
but which, as the author suggests, might be worth a second and deeper
look. From the standpoint of their legality, Professor Alexander would
pass filling station award games (since only fungible gasoline is at stake),
but would veto similar games in food markets because the gaming
promotion "might help to reinforce irrationality" in the housewife's
choice of one store over another. It might be noted, however, that there
are always irrational elements in a consumer's decision, induced or
augmented by any number of trade features-parking, baby tending,
Muzak, decor, and even pleasant sales personnel-that lie well beyond
FTC jurisdiction. More interesting is Professor Alexander's suggestion
that the FTC's almost congenital opposition to the sale of products by
any scheme that smacks of gambling should be reexamined in light of
the general social-and, of course, political-reassessment of gambling
as a factor in American life.
These considerations, however tangential they may appear, lead
back to the principal thesis of the book-that caveat emptor is dead
and, inferentially, consumerism is king. Professor Alexander, and
others,7 would now concentrate on giving the consumer accurate and
meaningful information on which to base his individual and collective
decisions.
Professor Alexander also urges that the Commission become more
experimental in its procedures and techniques, that it concern itself
more with broader policy concepts than its judicial processes adduce,
and that it "give adequate consideration to important aspects of national
interest." Refinement of so broad a proposal is clearly in order, but
the author pretty much lets it go at that. Professor Alexander leaves us
poised at the threshold and, to some, this will be the signal failure of
his book. But we have much independent evidence that the suggestion
7 For instance, since taking charge of the Antitrust Division, Harvard's Donald
Turner has repeatedly called for new sources and, perhaps, transmittal systems of product

information.
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has been grasped and implemented, whether from this or other sources,
instinctively or full-blown from Jove's forehead. In any event, experimentation-the search for certainty, for ultimate truth-is on. Indeed,
consumerism may not long be a game, but simply a foxhunt with little
or no play left for the competitive aspects of "creative" advertising
(whatever the connotation).
Two principal developments have occurred recently bearing on
the plea for a more positive policy approach, First, the Commission has
launched rulemaking proceedings designed to foreshorten, if not obviate, evidentiary proceedings in prescribed product advertising,"
thereby running through the red flag raised by at least one court against
"the procedural impropriety of the Commission's use of official notice
as a substitute for proof .

. . ."9

It is widely believed that, if adopted,

these rules will be legislative or substantive in character and therefore
virtually self-executing. If so, they will stand in marked contrast to the
interpretative Guides and Trade Regulation Rules heretofore issued
(and set out in toto as the book's appendices). Had this development
been anticipated and discussed, the book would have been enhanced.
Second, the Commission has directly entered the civil rights arena,
an obviously important aspect of national interest, by charging deception to landlords ostensibly offering rental housing to all, without revealing that the apartments are not, in fact, available to Negroes.' 0 One
need hardly qualify as a bigot or racist to question either the FTC's
function or its potentiality for meaningful accomplishment here.
Whether or not the Commission can really do the job of reconciling the clear-cut need for honesty with the insistent demands of a supposedly free, competitive economy is, therefore, a very real question.
That the Commission has stumbled in the past and even taken a few
inglorious pratfalls in the course of its case-by-case articulation of not
only unlawful but also unsound advertising practices" is not necessarily-or even, some would say, arguably-sufficient reason to delegate
the functions of broad policy formulation to the Commission. Given all
that sound administrative expertise entails, we might still prefer that
the consumer, as king, ultimately rule himself rather than be screened
8 Perhaps the most provocative proceeding initiated since Professor Alexander published relates to advertising of systemic analgesic drugs. Proposed Trade Regulation, 32
Fed. Reg. 9843, 17601 (1967). If promulgated, the Commission promises henceforth to "rely
upon the Rule to resolve" relevant issues in adjudicative proceedings.
9 Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180, 187 (6th Cir. 1966).
18,122
10 First Buckingham Community, Inc., FTC Docket 8750, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(1967).
i See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 317 F.2d
669 (2d Cir. 1963).
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from the life of the market by a regulatory regency. There is, after
all, still something to be said for free choice, however erratic, irrational, or even irresponsible. To the extent that Professor Alexander
inveighs against decisional nit-picking, he does us the service of reminding us that administrators cannot be made infallible by Congressional
fiat, but will always function in the realm of human frailty, again not
necessarily an unhealthy thing. As I read Professor Alexander, the message is, simply, "protect the consumer, sure, but don't patronize him."
In the long run, the consumer's role in the competitive order contributes significantly to keeping the competitors honest and, for that reason
alone and without reference to caveat emptor, is worthy of retention.
Sidney P. Howell, Jr.*
Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1943, Princeton University; LL.B. 1949, Cornell
Law School.

Dollars, Delay and the Automobile Victim. Studies in Reparation for
Highway Injuries and Related Court Problems. WALTER E. MEYER
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF LAW. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill

Company. 1968. Pp. xvii, 486. $9.50.
Last September, my students were led into the thicket of tort law
via a heretofore winding and incomplete path-liability insurance.
There were recent reports of a bold, new program to construct a superhighway, broad and straight, through the thorniest part of the thicket.
Our travels uncovered numerous surveyor's stakes along the path, but
it seemed that scarcely a spade of earth had been turned. Perhaps I
would have been better able to convince my students that appearances
are deceiving, had the present volume of readings been at hand as a
guide.
The text gathers studies conducted over the past decade by scholars under grants from the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law.,
As described by Professor Maurice Rosenberg in his Foreword, these
and other investigations not yet completed "constitute a near-monopoly of the findings and writings produced in this generation on the
actual operation of present systems for compensating traffic victims."2
With the number of traffic injuries climbing into the tens of millions
and direct costs soaring to billions of dollars, no problem in tort law
commands higher priority for research and resolution.
The contributing authors range over a spectrum of interrelated
problems organized under three major heads: "Dimensions of the
Economic and the Delay Problems," "Proposed Remedies for Congested Courts," and "Theories and Proposals for Improved Reparation
Systems." The compilation opens with samples of field work and
statistical analyses that lay bare the shortcomings of common law tort
liability and accident compensation, 3 and concludes with observations
drawn in part from the Michigan survey of automobile accidents 4 It
is interesting to correlate the conclusions reached by some or all of the
1

Accordingly, the text does not include some of the major contributions in this area,

such as W. BLUM & H. KALVFN, PUBLIC PERSP.ECrVES ON A PRIVATE LAw PROBLENt (1965); A.
EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR TnE TRAFFIC VxcriM-A VOLUNTARY COMPENSATION
PLAN (1954), appearing also in 43 CALI. L. REV. 1 (1955); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TOsT,
cli. XI (1956); COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR R.ESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT
BY THE COMMITTEE To STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AurOMoILE ACCIDENTS

(1932).

2 P. iv.
3 Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics
of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961); Morris & Paul, The Financial
Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1962).
4 A. CONRAD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTz & R. BOMBAUGH, AuTromoII.E ACCIDENT
CosrTs AND PAYmNTs (1964).

BOOK REVIEWS

authors: Where the victim retains an attorney, the incidence and
amount of recovery are significantly greater; recoveries are, for the most
part, modest-but severe injuries are generally undercompensated
while minor injuries often are overcompensated; many injuries go
totally uncompensated; large settlements are not reached at the earlier
stages of a claim, and the pressure for settlement usually operates oppressively upon the low-income victim. A concensus emerges that the
individualized procedure of tort litigation and the multifarious sources
of reparation (jury awards, health insurance, social security, workmen's
compensation, accident insurance, and automobile liability insurance)
do not achieve an equitable and efficient solution.
Having raised these complex issues, documented by actual case
studies, the symposium proceeds to the procedural problems of accident
litigation. The guiding hand of Professor Rosenberg is evident throughout the finely drawn analyses of special procedures designed to reverse
the pattern of congested calendars and to reduce the hardships attendant upon delay in the courts. Again, there are findings based upon
empirical studies; conclusions may be at least tentatively drawn evaluating the efficacy of techniques initiated in some jurisdictions-auditors, split trials, arbitration. All these selections serve to enlighten the
student of procedure as well as the student of torts.
The last part of the text presents excerpts from the famous study
of Professors Keeton and O'Connell, 5 a brain-stretching sally into
economic theory by Professor Calabresi, 6 and a comprehensive overview
with recommendations by Professor Conard. The details of the Keeton
and O'Connell "Motor Vehicle Basic Protection Insurance Act" are
summarized,8 including the major proposal for benefits up to ten thousand dollars for personal injury without proof of fault. Pain and suffering and property damage are excluded from basic protection benefits.
A scheme of compulsory private insurance is recommended, but no
proposal is advanced for an agency, such as a workmen's compensation
board, to handle claims. The program includes an assigned claims plan,
the net loss principle to eliminate overlapping benefits, supplementary
coverage, periodic rather than lump sum reimbursements, and many
other features.
Of course, the Keeton and O'Connell plan must be read in full
5 R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRaAric Vicrim (1965).

6 Calabresi, Fault,Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YAIE
L.J. 216 (1965).
7 Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MiCH. L. REV. 279
(1964).
8 Pp. 341-66.
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to appreciate its craftsmanship and foundations. The particular provisions noted above exemplify its scope and tenor. It is significant that
the authors agree with earlier suggestions that economic loss (work loss)
must receive prompt, if minimal, compensation outside the framework
of tort liability concepts, and that pain and suffering damages must be
retrieved through extra insurance coverage or a negligence trial. The
creative suggestions of Professors Ehrenzweig, 9 James, 10 and Morris'1
are in accord with some of the fundamental propositions upon which
the plan has been built. It has been a long time since the Columbia
Report of 1932,12 and many a good idea has been dropped in the hopper. Now, finally, a plan has issued forth that is so complete it has been
introduced into the New York legislature without any modification of
substance. 13
Since not only the legal activist, but also the prospective lawyer
and legislator, should be apprised of the surge of the law in a longawaited direction, I recommend that students be directed toward this
symposium and encouraged to sample its contents. It offers a rich
selection of theoretical, empirical, substantive, and procedural studies,
at a level of integration that many students would not encounter until
a seminar in their final year. In probing the problems of accident
reparation, the student touches the reality of the world in which he
must function.
Josephine Y. King*
9 Supra note 1,
10 Supra note I.

11 Supra note 3.
12 Supra note 1.
Is (1968) Sen. Int. No. 3055 (Mr. Bronston), (1968) Assem. Int. No. 4772 (Mr. Kretchmer) ("An Act to amend the vehicle and tra~fic law, in relation to establishing the motor
vehicle basic protection insurance act').
* Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Ph.D. 1950,
Bryn Mawr College; LL.B. 1965, State University of New York at Buffalo.

Presidential Electiohg. (2d ed.). NELSON W. PoLgBY ANDi AARON B.
WILbAvSit-k. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1968. Pp. xv,
304. $4.95. ($2.50 Paperbound).
Springboard to the White House. JAMEs W. DAvis. New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell Company. 1967. Pp. xii, 324. $5.95.
The Republican Establishment. STEPHEN HESS AND DAVID S. BRODER.
New York: Harper & Row. 1967. Pp. vi, 440. $7.95.
In every presidential election year the reade: faces a deluge of
books that claim to offer special insight into the coming election.
Such volumes fall into several categories: campaign biographies (authorized or not), collections of past speeches designed to portray the
candidate favorably, arguments in favor of certain election strategies,
and more serious sttidies in presidential politics released in time for
the greatest market impact. This review will consider several recent
books purportedly in the last category.
I
One's first goal should be to understand the framework of presidential politics. Professors Polsby and Wildavsky's revised edition of
PresidentialElections is an excellent piece with which to begin that
task. Their thesis is: "The Strategies of participants in a Presidential
election make sense, once we understand the web of circumstances in
which they operate," 1 The campaign can be visualized as a giant chess
game. Each player seeks to capitalize on his board strength and attract a majority of the electorate within the following strategic environment:
(1) Most people do not care about most things most of the time.
(2) They therefore vote out of party habit rather than in response to policy appeals.
(3) People tend to vote only when prodded by groups of activists (parties), though Republicans generally need less prodding.
(4) Parties exist to win elections.
(5) Either party has a reasonable chance to win most national
elections:
(a) the Democrats because they are in the majority, and
(b) the Republicans because they are more likely to vote,
have better access to money, and are favored by the press.
1 PoLSBY & WILDAVSKY at 3.
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(6) Interest groups (every voter belongs to several) can be activated by policy commitments and promises of access to government
decision-making.
(7) Each national party is a loose coalition of interest groups and
state and local parties.
2
(8) The electoral college favors voters in large, two-party states.
This information is familiar to political scientists, but not to
amateur analysts who believe in a policy-oriented, independent electorate. The authors believe this system to be remarkably stable;3 even
in 1964, when the Republicans seemingly ignored conventional doctrines, the election proved the validity of the above-stated principles. 4
Yet, it might be difficult to convince the ardent supporters of Senators Goldwater and McCarthy, who so highly value ideological purity. Has the post-Sputnik educational revolution created a better
informed and more policy-oriented electorate? Do the "rules" operate when there is a single overriding issue such as extremism or war?
Perhaps these questions follow the tendency of the political scientist
to convert statistical patterns into immutable rules.
The book's greatest weakness is its failure to consider how voters
form party and policy preferences. The authors do discuss Republican ownership of newspapers, but their conclusions are based on
studies more than ten years old. 5 This emphasis hides an important
fact: since 1956, television has become the most significant source of
voter information. 6 If control over dissemination of political information is a major political asset, we should examine the corporate
structure of networks rather than newspapers. Whoever prepares the
fifteen-second stories on elections has far more influence than the
newspaper publishers in shaping the public's view of issues and personalities.
II
How does an aspirant win his party's nomination for President?
One obvious path toward that goal is the presidential primary election. In Springboard to the White House, Professor Davis has com2 For an interesting statistical proof of this fact, see Banzhaf, One Man, 3 312 Votes:
A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 ViLE. L. REv. 304 (1968).
3 POLSBY & WLDAvSKY at 56.
4 Id. at 169-70.
5 Id. at 43-51. They concede that the working press is strongly Democratic.
6 V. KEY, PuBLic OPiNION AND AMmUCAN DEmOCRACY 345-51 (1961).
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piled an interesting array of statistics concerning primaries since 1912.
He has not, however, put the raw data into a workable analytical
framework. Consequently, his book is an unhappy compromise between journalistic and academic styles. It neither explores the thought
process of political decision-makers nor explains what political analysts hope to learn from primary results. Furthermore, Davis tends
to stretch the facts to establish his "firm conviction" that the John
F. Kennedy school of winning presidential nominations by proving
vote-getting ability in the primaries is in accord with United States
political reality.7 In fact, no presidential candidate has yet created his
nomination coalition out of the primaries. This is not to assert that
primaries have no meaning. They are a means to an end, but not an
end in themselves. The primaries are both a dramatic assertion of a
segment of public opinion and a vehicle serving several additional
political functions.
Primaries confirm reality. Davis greatly exaggerates their influence when he asserts that Wayne Morse and Margaret Chase Smith
were presidential primary knockout victims." These Senators were
never in the race, except possibly in their fondest dreams.
Primaries salve consciences. The 1948 Oregon primary merely
indicated that Dewey was slightly more popular than Stassen among
Beaver State Republicans. Yet, it "proved" to politicians, who had
no use for Stassen, that he lacked popularity and political skill.9 Barry
Goldwater's victory in the 1964 California primary gave old-line Taft
supporters, yearning to nominate a conservative, an acceptable reason
for so voting.10
7 DAVIS at v.

8 Id. at 108. Senator Morse lost the 1960 Democratic primary in Oregon, Senator
Smith the 1964 Republican primary in Maine.
9 Stassen made several basic errors in strategy. He divided his time between Ohio,
where the Taft-Bricker organization was strong, and Oregon, the important battleground.
Id. at 58-59. Stassen was trapped by his continual insistence on a face-to-face debate with
Dewey. Suddenly, the challenge was accepted by Dewey, who proposed ground rules
and location strongly in his favor. The radio debate was a disaster for Stassen. He also
failed to become more than a regional governor. Stassen moved to Pennsylvania instead
of trying for the Senate seat that eventually led Hubert Humphrey to the Vice-Presidency.
(This interpretation is derived from a conversation on January 80, 1964, with the late
Victor Johnston of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, a former associate
of Governor Stassen.)
10 Goldwater received only 51.1% of the vote but all 86 delegates, because California
law requires a slate of candidates equal to the total number of delegates. CAL. ELECaONS
CODE § 6052 (West 1961). If the delegates had been elected by Congressional districts,
Rockefeller would have been entitled to at least 32 delegates. Los Angeles Times, June
4, 1964, at 17, col. 6. This quirk in the electoral law significantly increased the psychological impact of Goldwater's victory and gave him a solid bloc of delegates, nearly 15%o
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Primaries kill liabilities (or confirm them), Politicians may hesitate to select a given candidate because of a suspected flaw in his
political image. In 1960 Kennedy showed that his Catholicism, youth,
and inexperience would not be handicaps in the general election. In
1952 Taft wag not given the nomination his party so desired to bestow upon him, because he failed to kill the nagging fear that "Taft
can't win."

Thus, the strategies of participants in primary elections do
make sense. Each candidate attempts to use the primaries to persuade
political leaders of certain facts favorable to his election. Could public
opinion polls fulfill these functions as well? A sophisticated poll can
indicate more precise impressions of the public mood than the yes-no
choice of a primary. If so, why an election? Polls teach a representative
sample of the people, but the electorate, people concerned enough to
vote, is not necessarily representative. Primaries approximate the aura
of electoral choice in providing raw data for analysis along with the
polls. A national primary would not improve the process. Most practical observers agree that the cost of a national primary would be prohibitive (in the absence of federal subsidies), that it would not be an
effective method of narrowing the electoral choice to two candidates,
that it would be highly destructive of a stable two party system, and
that it would probably decrease the effectiveness of public choice over
the nomination.
III
This discussion has assumed that the President is nominated by
unequals-people, delegates, and party leaders. There is no one-man,
one-vote rule. Who are the mysterious powers-that-be? What motivates them? How do they lead? In The Republican Establishment,
Hess and Broder have made a valuable journalistic attempt to answer
these questions. Their emphasis on the candidates, though it limits
the long-term usefulness of the book, is dearly worthwhile because
of the depth of their studies into the personality of each candidate
and the men behind him. Of course, there are problems in editorial
selection-e.g., Nelson Rockefeller was omitted. The National Review views this year-old arbitrary decision as proof that Rockefeller
is not a significant figure in the coming election. 1 Broder takes reof the vote needed to win. These delegates, combined with other committed delegates, made
the nomination virtually certain. This provided the Taft wing of the party with another
reason to support Goldwater.
11 Bauman, Thd GOP Today, 20 NATIoNALR
Rvm
95 (1968).
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sponsibility for the choice; he believed that the Republicans, who
booed Rockefeller in the Cow Palace only four years ago, could not
possibly nominate him. This conclusion may be correct, but it is
obvious from the pressure placed on Rockefeller in March to enter
the race that many party professionals believe him to be the strongest
candidate. Broder has since drawn two lessons from these facts: the
political situation can change rapidly, and the press has a very poor
2
record of predicting such changes.'
The authors' view of the GOP can be examined in terms of
Richard Nixon, the front runner for the presidential nomination.
He is a man of experience who fervently hopes to be President. His
mission in life is a function of his desires, social background, religion,
intellect, and ability to withstand pressure. The other potential candidates have different mixtures of the same qualities; they are working at cross purposes toward a similar goal and within the given
power structure. The National Committee is a group of technocrats
rather than ideologues; because they desire the satisfaction and power
that flows from placing men in office, their goal is to promote winners
rather than policies. The congressional leadership represents the Main
Street entrepreneur. Since it seeks to assert the greatest possible influence on legislation, given its minority position, it must often form
coalitions of opposition. Because people oppose legislation for vastly
different reasons, any attempts to form definite alternatives can only
weaken the influence of minority party leaders. The governors are
not in a minority position; thus, they desire effective solutions to
political problems rather than mere influence. Party financiers promote personalities for the same reasons as the technocrats and, in
addition, to further ideological purity or the stability in which their
economic interests can best be advanced. It is dear that the goals of
these major power centers are not entirely consistent. Herein lies the
conservative-liberal split in the party.
Hess and Broder did not set out to prove a thesis as did the authors of the other books considered. Yet, they believed their project
was useful, because they accepted the observation of Governor Evans
of Washington that the 1966 elections gave the Republican Party "the
luxury of choice." 1 3 It appears, however, that the Republicans may
follow the same course as in 1960 when Governor Rockefeller believed Vice-President Nixon too powerful within the party organization to be denied the nomination. Both parties are selecting candi12 Conversation with David S. Broder, March 11, 1968.
13 HEss & BRODER at

1.
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dates to solve today's problems by methods based on obsolete social
configurations. The Democratic candidates are attempting to recreate
the old Roosevelt, Stevenson, or Kennedy coalitions. Do the parties
lag behind the times because of the length of time it takes to achieve
leadership? When leaders reach power, have they done so on the basis
of social judgments formed many years previously? When both major
political parties are substantially dominated by interests unconcerned
with or opposed to the basic premises on which the society operates,
the situation cannot remain static. There is too great a tendency on
the part of the political parties to promulgate dogmatic answers to
complex issues by generalizing many partially analogous local problems into one large national problem. The new dominant party will
be the one that is first to develop pragmatic solutions, whether based
on conservative or liberal premises, to the problems of everyday living created by an industrial society in a world of rapid social change.
Stephen H. Hutzelman*
* Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. A.B. 1964, Oberlin College; LL.B. 1967, Cornell
Law School. Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the
Department of Justice.

The Jury and the Defense of Insanity. RrrA JAMES SIMON. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1967. Pp. xiv, 269. $10.00
The Jury and the Defense of Insanity is an attempt to study and
document a single aspect of Anglo-America's most revered and maligned legal institution, the criminal jury. The institution is exhaustively examined in an attempt to formulate certain conclusions about
the manner in which a jury handles or mishandles the legal concept of
insanity as a criminal defense. Although Professor Simon approaches
the subject primarily as a social scientist, she also displays an awareness
of the concern of current legal scholars and jurists for the usefulness of
the jury as the ultimate trier of fact, especially in technical and specialized areas involving professional expertise.
How often has the trial lawyer, in defeat, said: "If only I had...
the result might have been different." By changing the format presented to different juries, Miss Simon is able to provide some insight
into this dilemma. The study was conducted as part of the controversial University of Chicago Jury Project. The technique involved
using actual jurors drawn from panels in Chicago, Minneapolis, and
St. Louis, and submitting to them an edited and taped transcript of an
actual trial. The psychiatric testimony was varied in different trials, as
was the type of crime charged and instructions on the ultimate issue of
sanity. A statistical analysis was compiled of juror types, including the
following factors: occupation, income, education, political preference,
sex, ethnic background, religion, age, and social status. The percentage
of ballots cast for a guilty verdict by the above types is revealing in
light of contemporary sociological and legal rules of thumb used in
"voir dire" jury selection. The author's conclusions need not always
be accepted for the reader to gain insight into the jury and to affirm
or reject personal opinions and preconceptions based only on individual
experiences.
The author devotes a chapter to the "Sound of the Jury," which
analyzes in detail specific jurors' reactions to certain types of evidence
and testimony and the relative weight attached to the variables. One
significant conclusion is that jurors clearly lay much greater stress on
immediate environmental circumstances than upon "case history" environment, which is so often dwelled upon in psychiatric analysis and
testimony. The interplay of individual minds, the art of persuasion
among individual jurors-both rational and irrational-provide a
unique and fascinating peek at a living human institution attempting
to reach a just result under rules of law and disputed sets of facts. To
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convey a feeling of what this experiment has sought to capture, the
author has included in the appendix a single transcript of one of the
juries, including the variables they considered and their individual
backgrounds.
This project and its treatment was an ambitious eI$eavor. It
necessarily falls short of assessing the effect of the infinite number of
variables that influence a jury in a close case on the facts. It should not
be read as a complete and definitive analysis of the workings of a
criminal jury. If it is, it will be misleading because of its emphasis on
uniformity in presentation. The courtroom will always remain a living
stage, a spontaneous drama with different actors and directors, all with
unique ideas on what is effective and persuasive with their audience,,
the jury.
This analytical treatise, however, gives a clearer insight into the
jury at work and the effect of several types of psychiatric testimony
before various types of jurors under different instructions of law. This
was its object, and to the extent that the work confines itself to this
limited analysis, it is effective. The book also is of value to those who
practice the more subtle and imaginative arts of trial advocacy in an
actual courtroom, where the environs are less controlled and therefore
the results less predictable.
Thomas F. Londrigan*
• Member of the Illinois Bar. A.B. 1959, University of Notre Dame; LL.B. 1962,
University of Illinois.

The New Industrial State. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH. Boston:
Houghton Miffin Company. 1967. Pp. xiv, 427. $6r95.
In The New Industrial State, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith
picks up right where he left off in his previous work, The Affluent
Society. Once again, his objective is to clarify our thinking about
American political economy and to take on the "conventional wisdoms"
that prevail. In this writer's opinion, the author attains these goals.
To begin with, Professor Galbraith describes the importance that
economic planning has assumed as a result of technological innovation
and concomitant specialized tasks. Technology has impelled business
to make judgments that involve planning. But a firm cannot plan if it
cannot predict its prices, sales, and labor and capital costs. The market
creates uncertainties that the employer seeks to eliminate in different
ways: (1) by superseding the market through vertical integration; (2)
by controlling prices by the buyer and/or seller through size and consequent economic power; (3) where units are large, by entering into
contracts that specify prices for and amounts of products to be sold and
bought for substantial periods of time.
But all these routes necessitate size. As Galbraith says:
Size is the general servant of technology, not the special servant of
profits. The small firm cannot be restored by breaking the power of
the larger ones. It would require, rather, the rejection of the technology which since earliest consciousness we are taught to applaud.
It would require that we have simple products made with simple
equipment from readily available materials by unspecialized labor.
Then the period of production would be short; the market would
reliably provide the labor, equipment and materials required for
production; there would be neither possibility nor the need for
managing the market for the finished product. If the market thus
reigned there would be, and could be, no planning. No elaborate
organization would be required. The small firm would then, at last,
do very well. All that is necessary is to undo nearly everything that,
at whatever violence to meaning, has been called progress in the
last half century. There must be no thought of supersonic travel, or
exploring the moon, and there will not be many automobiles.1
The consequences are manifold. For one thing, Professor Galbraith argues that the "technostructure" of corporate specialists who
run the firm's affairs are not primarily concerned with maximum profit.
Growth and a reasonable flow of earnings-sufficient to satisfy the
stockholder whose interest is maximum profit-are the main objective.
General Motors will not-as it could-drive American Motors out of
1 P. 33.
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business through price cuts.2 Without feigning altruism, the corporations have goals distinguishable from those of their buccaneering
predecessors.
In light of this analysis, it is easy to understand Professor Galbraith's contempt for antitrust legislation. For him, antitrust prosecutions constitute a misguided attempt to turn back the clock. But one
point he does not discuss is the restraining influence that antitrust law
may have on the technostructure. Is it not possible that the absence of
these restraints might contribute to a resurgence of some degree of
profit maximization? On the technostructure's responsiveness to the
owner (i.e., stockholder) under these conditions, Professor Galbraith
is silent.
There are other weaknesses in The New IndustrialState. Although
the author points out the acceptability to business of Keynesian economics and governmental spending, the fact is that much of this acceptability is premised on space and military contracts. What will be the
reaction of the technostructure when these relationships come to an
end? The book does not say.
Another weakness is that the role of trade unionism in public
employment is relegated to a footnote. 3 This is particularly unfortunate
in light of the following conclusion:
Since World War II, the acceptance of the union by the industrial
firm and the emergence thereafter of an era of comparatively
peaceful industrial relations have been hailed as the final triumph
of trade unionism. On closer examination it is seen to reveal many
of the features of Jonah's triumph over the whaleA
Events have a way of making the printed word obsolete. Not only
is there now a general upswing in industrial disputes, but also the relationship between trade unions and public employers has substantially
contributed to the increase in stoppages of the past two or three years.
In the public sector, labor-management relations have not reached the
age of maturity of which Galbraith speaks. This is because both parties
are novices, and, more important, the owners of the enterprise (taxpayers) seem rather reserved about paying the costs of public services.6
All this deserves more than a footnote.
One of the wisest points in The New Industrial State-and one
that is not sufficiently understood by Western intellectuals-is, in the
2 See Gould, Book Review, COMMONWEAL, June 9, 1967, at

350.

3 P. 276 n.5.
4 P. 281.
6 See generally State of New York, Governor's Comm. on Public Employee Relations
(March 31, 1966).
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author's words, a "digression." I am referring to Galbraith's contention
that socialism (or nationalization of basic industry) is irrelevant as a
means to achieve effective governmental regulation of the technostructure. Once management and ownership evolved as separate entities,
the idea of nationalization became an anachronism. 6 Galbraith puts it
this way:
When the case of democratic socialism began to emerge in the
closing decades of the last century, the capitalist entrepreneur was
still in authority. The firm was small enough and the state of technology simple enough so that he could wield substantial power of
decision. The belief that his power could be exercised instead by a
parliament or by a directly responsible agent was not an idle
dream. Certainly a public body could supersede his power to set
prices and wages and therewith his power to exploit the consumer
and the wage-earner.
The misfortune of democratic socialism has been the misfortune of the capitalist. When the latter could no longer control,
democratic socialism was no longer an alternative. The technical
complexity and planning and associated scale of operations, that
took power from the capitalist entrepreneur and lodged it with the7
technostructure, removed it also from the reach of social control.
Professor Galbraith concludes by prophesying that the growing
"educational and scientific estate" will serve as the new counterweight
to technostructure policies. He laments the artificial creation of consumer demand through advertising by the technostructure. The educational and scientific estate, having more organizational independence
than the technostructure and a disdain for the latter's campaigns to
create markets, is increasingly influential. In the author's opinion, it
will take the place of the unions and the rest of the New Deal coalition
and play a meaningful political role-i.e., restraining technostructure
planning that is against the public interest.
William B. Gould*
6 See C. CROSLAND, Tnm FuTuRE oF SocIALism (1956).
7 Pp. 103-04.

* Member of the Michigan Bar. A.B. 1958, University of Rhode Island; LL.B. 1961,
Cornell Law School; Graduate study 1962-63, London School of Economics.

